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Comparative Negligence in Suits Against Accountants: 
A Statutory and Policy Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most puzzling and debated issues in accounting mal-
practice cases is whether and to what extent the defense of comparative 
negligence is available to accountants. In Fullmer v. Wohlfeiler & 
Beck/ the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, interpretating Utah 
law, affirmed the federal district court's adoption of a judicial policy 
limiting an accountant's defense of comparative negligence to cases in 
which a plaintiff's negligence interfered with the accountant's ability to 
perform his duty.2 Applied in a number of jurisdictions,3 this policy is 
commonly known as the National Surety" rule. In a recent trend, how-
ever, courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the National Surety lim-
itation on the apportionment of fault in accounting malpractice cases. 11 
This comment argues that comparative negligence should be applied in 
accounting malpractice actions unrestricted by the National Surety 
rule. 
Whether and to what extent a state's comparative negligence stat-
ute applies to accounting malpractice cases turns on the answers to 
three questions. First, as a matter of statutory construction, does the 
statute apply to cases in which the injury is only pecuniary and in-
volves no damage to physical property? Second, are actions against ac-
countants primarily contractual in nature, thereby possibly precluding 
application of comparative negligence? And, third, assuming the statute 
does apply to actions against accountants, should its application be re-
stricted to cases in which the plaintiff's negligence has interfered with 
the accountant's ability to perform his duty? 
Sections II and III of this comment analyze the first two questions 
in the context of Utah's comparative negligence statute. Neither ques-
tion has been conclusively decided by Utah courts. Although the focus 
is on Utah law, the analysis is applicable to jurisdictions with similar 
1. 905 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1990) 
2. The court did not address the viable issue of whether the Utah comparative negligence 
statute then in effect was applicable to pecuniary losses. See infra notes 8-33 and accompanying 
text. 
3. See cases cited infra note 52. 
4. National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939). For discussion of 
the National Surety rule, see infra notes 42-101 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text. 
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statutes. These sections conclude that Utah's comparative negligence 
statute is applicable in tort suits brought against accountants. 
Section IV analyzes the National Surety rule in its historical con-
text, arguing that the rule is obsolete in modern comparative negligence 
jurisdictions. Section V reviews cases representing a trend away from 
National Surety. Section V also analyzes the National Surety rule in 
light of the fairness, deterrence, and compensation policies of tort law 
in an effort to determine whether those policies are better served by 
limiting the defense of comparative negligence in suits against account-
ants. The analysis shows that the National Surety rule produces, in 
certain situations, a profound distortion in tort law policies. This com-
ment concludes that the unrestricted application of comparative negli-
gence serves the ends of the law better than the restrictions imposed by 
the National Surety rule. 
II. APPLICATION oF UTAH's CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
STATUTE TO PECUNIARY LossEs IN Suns AGAINST AccouNTANTS 
The type of injury resulting from accounting malpractice is pecu-
niary in nature. Whether Utah's or any state's comparative negligence 
statute applies to cases involving only pecuniary injury is first a ques-
tion of statutory construction. This section addresses the question of 
statutory construction by analyzing Utah's comparative negligence stat-
ute in both its current6 and previous7 forms. It also reviews Utah court 
decisions interpreting the statutes and case law from other jurisdictions 
interpreting similar statutes. 
A. Utah's Original Comparative Negligence Statute 
Utah initially adopted comparative negligence in 1973 by legisla-
tive enactment.8 Prior to being repealed and replaced by a significantly 
different comparative negligence statute in 1986,9 section 1 of the 1973 
statute read: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any 
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or 
gross negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if 
such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross negligence 
of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages al-
6. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987). 
7. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-37 (repealed 1986). Because of its potential applicability to 
pending accounting malpractice cases, Utah's former comparative negligence statute is also ex-
amined. See infra notes 8-33 and accompanying text. 
8. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-37 (repealed 1986) [hereinafter 1973 statute]. 
9. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987). 
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lowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering. As used in this act, "con-
tributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."10 
157 
The most significant question posed by the 1973 statute in suits against 
accountants is whether the "property" clause encompasses pecuniary 
losses where there is no damage to physical property. Although Utah 
courts have not directly addressed this issue/ 1 there is support for the 
proposition that the 1973 statute contemplates pecuniary losses. First, 
the 1973 statute was modeled after the Wisconsin statute, and Wiscon-
sin courts have applied their statute to pecuniary losses. 12 Second, 
courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes also apply them to 
pecuniary losses. 13 Third, the policies behind the comparative negli-
gence statute warrant application to pecuniary injury. 14 
1. Wisconsin roots 
The first section of Utah's 1973 statute was adopted from, and 
comprises the whole of, the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act in 
effect in 1971.111 lnjensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 16 the 
court not only recognized that the Utah legislature intended to adopt 
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute but also recognized when 
a statute from another state is adopted, the legislature is presumed to 
have adopted that state's judicial interpretations of the statute as well. 17 
The presumption that Utah has adopted Wisconsin's judicial in-
terpretations does not require Utah Courts to summarily adopt every 
Wisconsin decision. 18 This is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court's 
rejection of the Wisconsin method of comparing a plaintiffs negligence 
10. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (repealed 1986) (emphasis added). 
11. Dicta in one Utah case could be interpreted as excluding pecuniary injury from the 1973 
statute. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
15. Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Act provides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or an injury to per-
son or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983). Utah courts have recognized that the 1973 statute is 
patterned after the Wisconsin statute. See Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1982); 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1984). 
16. 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984). 
17. /d. at 904. 
18. The dissent in Jensen stated that case law from states with similar comparative negli-
gence statutes is also persuasive. ld. at 911 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
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with each defendant individually.19 However, it may be argued that 
Wisconsin case law is particularly persuasive in interpreting Utah's 
1973 statute. This is important because the Wisconsin case /mark In-
dustries, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. 20 applied comparative negligence 
to apportion liability for pecuniary losses in a suit against accountants. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions, including /mark Industries, are 
reviewed below. 
2. Case law from jurisdictions with similar statutes 
Other jurisdictions have applied statutes similar to Utah's 1973 
comparative negligence statute to pecuniary losses in suits against ac-
countants,21 other professionals,22 and in other cases of economic loss.23 
In /mark Industries, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co.,24 a Wisconsin court 
upheld the division of liability for pecuniary losses in an accounting 
malpractice case according to Wisconsin's comparative negligence stat-
ute. Significantly, the issue of whether comparative negligence was ap-
plicable to pecuniary losses was not addressed by the court, and no 
previous Wisconsin court had ruled on the issue. A legitimate inference 
can be made that Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute, and by 
implication Utah's 1973 statute, contemplates pecuniary losses. 
Similarly, in Darnell Photographs, Inc. v. Great American In-
surance Co. ,26 the Colorado appellate court specifically rejected the no-
tion that the phrase "injury to property" in the Colorado comparative 
negligence statute (nearly identical to Utah's 1973 statute) is limited to 
tangible property. The court stated that 
[i]t is well recognized that comparative negligence statutes have been 
enacted to ameliorate harsh results which sometimes occur under the 
doctrine of contributory negligence. To adopt the narrow construction 
19. /d. at 909-10. The court based its conclusion to reject the Wisconsin method of compari-
son on additional sections added to the Utah statute that were not found in the Wisconsin statute. 
20. 148 Wis. 2d 605, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989). 
21. Halla Nursery v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1990); H. Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) (New Jersey statute modeled after Wiscon-
sin's); First Nat'l Bank v. Kehn Ranch, 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1986) (interpretation of Minne-
sota law); University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); 
Imark Indus. v. Arthur Young & Co., 148 Wis. 2d 605, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989). 
22. Somma v. Gracey, 15 Conn. App. 371, 544 A.2d 668 (1988) (attorney); Erlich v. First 
Nat'l Bank, 208 N.J. Super. 264, 505 A.2d 220 (Law Div. 1984) (investment advisor). 
23. Robinson v. Poudre Valley Fed. Credit Union, 680 P.2d 241 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (suit 
against bank and its employee); Darnell Photographs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 33 Colo. App. 256, 
519 P.2d 1225 (1974); Lippes v. Atlantic Bank, 69 A.D.2d 127, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 
1979) (bank); cf Miller v. Pine Bluff Hotel Co., 286 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1961) (interpreting Ar-
kansas statute). 
24. 148 Wis. 2d 605, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989). 
25. 33 Colo. App. 256, 519 P.2d 1225 (1974). 
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of the statute as proposed by defendant would defeat the purpose for 
which it was designed; therefore, we hold that the phrase "injury to 
property" in the comparative negligence statute is not necessarily lim-
ited to a physical injury to tangible property, but rather includes any 
damage resulting from invasion of one's property rights by actionable 
negligence.18 
The Colorado court's reasoning is compelling. It is unlikely that a leg-
islature would intend to ameliorate the harsh results of contributory 
negligence in cases of damage to physical property and at the same time 
intend to retain the same harsh results in cases of pecuniary loss. Al-
though no Utah court has conclusively ruled on the issue, statements of 
policy found in several Utah opinions are consistent with the rationale 
of Darnell Photographs, as reviewed below.27 
3. Policy behind the comparative negligence statute 
The Utah Supreme Court first examined Utah's 1973 statute in 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association.28 There, the court 
stated that "the purpose of [that] statute was to abolish contributory 
negligence as a complete defense and thus avoid the harshness which 
sometimes resulted when a party seeking redress was himself negligent 
...• "
29 Later, in Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,30 the 
court described the two objectives of the 1973 statute as "first, to allevi-
ate the harshness of the old common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence; and second to provide for a system of loss allocation by appor-
tioning liability based at least in part on fault .... "31 Given these 
objectives, it makes little sense to alleviate the harshness of the common 
law in some negligence cases but not in others. Further, no Utah court 
has articulated a useful purpose that would be served by not applying 
comparative negligence in cases where pecuniary losses are not accom-
panied by damage to tangible property. 
One Utah case which came close to applying the 1973 statute to 
pecuniary losses was Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson. 32 There, the court ap-
proved the allocation of fault where pecuniary losses (lost profits) were 
the result of negligent injury to physical property. It should be noted, 
however, that in Justice Oaks' concurrence, he stated that comparative 
26. /d. at 258, 519 P.2d at 1226 (citations omitted). 
27. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
28. 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977) (overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981)). 
29. /d. at 1249. 
30. 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984). 
31. /d. at 907. 
32. 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) (damage to truck and equipment used in business). 
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negligence "only applies to negligence 'resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property.' " 33 Justice Oaks did not elaborate on what he 
meant by "only," but a logical inference is that the 1973 statute does 
not apply to pecuniary losses. Nevertheless, case law from other juris-
dictions, as well as compelling public policy arguments, strongly sug-
gests that the 1973 statute applied to pecuniary losses. The same ques-
tion does not exist under the current statute. 
B. The Current Comparative Negligence Statute 
In 1986, the Utah Legislature repealed the 1973 statute and re-
placed it with the following: 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by 
that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defend-
ants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to 
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the propor-
tion of fault attributable to that defendant. 3 ' 
The Legislature defined the term "fault" to mean "any actionable 
breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately causing or contribut-
ing to injury or damages .... " 311 This definition, coupled with the 
fact that the 1986 statute omits the phrase "death or injury to person or 
property," broadens the 1986 statute to clearly apply to purely eco-
nomic losses. 
At first blush, the language of the 1986 statute appears to signifi-
cantly expand the scope of cases in which the defense of comparative 
negligence is available. However, the 1986 statute may be nothing more 
than a clarification of the intent embodied in the 1973 statute; that is, 
comparative negligence applies to all negligence actions. 
III. THE CoNTRACTUAL VERsus ToRTious NATURE or 
AccouNTING MALPRACTICE 
The second question of the three-part analysis is whether actions 
against accountants are contractual or tortious in nature. Some courts 
have answered this question by holding that actions against accountants 
arising from performance of their services may be brought in contract 
or tort. 36 Comparative negligence, however, is generally inapplicable in 
33. Id. at 732 (Oaks,]., concurring) (quoting Utah's 1973 statute). 
34. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 statute]. The 1986 statute be-
came effective April 28, 1986, and because no intention of retroactive application was articulated 
by the legislature, it is inapplicable to injuries occurring before that date. Stephens v. Henderson, 
741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 1987). 
35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1987). 
36. See Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987); Billings Clinic v. Peat 
155] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE FOR ACCOUNTANTS 161 
contract actions. 37 In variations of this general rule, it has been held 
that comparative negligence principles may be used to apportion dam-
ages in claims for breach of implied warranty38 and failure to mitigate 
damages. 39 Because actions against accountants may be brought in ei-
ther contract or tort, a question arises whether the application of com-
parative negligence should be limited to actions solely grounded in tort. 
In Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,"'0 the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit solved this problem by combining tort and contract 
claims against an accountant into a single cause of action. The court 
stated that "[d]espite the plurality of charges [whether management 
wrongdoing is a defense in a suit against accountants) is one question 
because breach of contract, negligence, and fraud, when committed by 
auditors, are a single form of wrongdoing under different names."41 
Although comparative negligence is generally inapplicable to actions in 
contract, combining both tort and contract claims into one cause of ac-
tion effectively makes comparative negligence a defense to a contract 
claim. While this approach may enhance judicial administration, it 
raises serious concerns whether plaintiffs in accounting malpractice 
cases would essentially be denied their contractual causes of action. 
A plaintiff in an accounting malpractice action generally controls 
whether the defense of comparative negligence will be available by 
choosing whether to litigate in tort or contract. Unless the court com-
bines tort and contract causes of action into one, or employs compara-
tive negligence principles to apportion damages in the contract suit, the 
theory ultimately prevailed upon will dictate whether comparative neg-
ligence will be used to apportion damages in suits against accountants. 
IV. THE National Surety RuLE-A juDICIAL DocTRINE OF 
LIMITING APPLICATION oF CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN SuiTS 
AGAINST AccoUNT ANTS 
The final question to be answered before comparative negligence 
Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899 (Mont. 1990); Video Corp. of Am. v. Frederick Flatto 
Assoc., 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 448 N.E.2d 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983): see also Hawkins, Profes-
sional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1959). 
37. See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 237 Kan. 873, 704 P.2d 372 (1985); 
Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983) (citing comments to UNIF. CoMP. FAULT AcT 
§I, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1982)); Behring Int'l v. Greater Houston Bank, 662 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1983); Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979). 
38. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). 
39. Mike's Fixtures v. Bombard's Access Floor Sys., 354 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). 
40. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (interpreting Illinois law). 
41. /d. at 453; see also Wedtech Corp. v. Hurdman (In re Wedtech Corp.), 81 Bankr. 240, 
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Genco, 686 F.2d at 453). 
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can be asserted in an accounting malpractice action is whether the de-
fense should be judicially restricted to cases in which a plaintiff's negli-
gence interfered with the accountant's ability to fulfill his duty. The 
origin of this theory can be traced to National Surety Corp. v. 
Lybrand,42 a 1939 New York case. Craig v. Anyon,48 a 1925 New 
York decision, is generally cited as the antithesis of National Surety. 
Although decided over two generations ago under common law contrib-
utory negligence, the debate sparked by these two cases still thrives in 
jurisdictions that have not conclusively decided the issue."" This section 
reviews the development of the Craig v. Anyon and National Surety 
rules and examines their underlying policies. What we find is that the 
two cases are not as diametrically opposed as is often stated. The con-
clusion reached is that the National Surety rule is obsolete and com-
parative negligence better serves the policies of tort law. 
A. The Craig v. Anyon and National Surety Split 
Craig v. Anyon and National Surety appear to set forth very dif-
ferent rules for allowing contributory negligence defenses in suits 
against accountants. Most later courts considering the issue have 
adopted one or the other based on its own interpretation of the merits 
of the case.411 However, upon closer examination, Craig v. Anyon and 
National Surety may not be as far apart as is generally assumed. 
Rather than conflicting policies of law, the differences can be better 
explained by the facts of each case, as discussed below. 
1. Craig v. Anyon 
In Craig v. Anyon, the client of an accounting firm sought dam-
ages from the accountant auditors for negligently failing to detect a 
large embezzlement scheme perpetrated by an employee. Recovery was 
denied, however, because the plaintiff was found to be contributorily 
negligent in giving the employee absolute control over the department 
42. 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939). 
43. 212 A.D. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (1925), afj'd, 242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1926). 
44. Articles by several commentators have addressed these two cases: Hawkins, supra note 
35; Mendel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice Actions, 12 
SETON HALL 292 (1983); Note, The Peculiar Treatment of Contributory Negligence in Account-
ants' Liability Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 329 (1990); Comment, Damage Apportionment in Ac-
counting Malpractice Actions: The Role of Comparative Fault, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 951. Profes-
sor Hawkins makes a persuasive argument that the National Surety rule is the preferred 
approach. 
45. See, e.g., Devco Premium Fin. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984) (following Craig v. Anyon); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 
345 N.W.2d 300 (1984) (following National Surety). 
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from which he embezzled, and for failing to supervise him. Both the 
auditors and the employer had been deceived by the employee. The 
court found that the embezzlement would have been discovered had the 
audit been performed properly, but it would also have been discovered 
had the employer properly supervised the employee.'8 Faced with de-
ciding which of the negligent parties would bear the entire loss under 
New York's contributory negligence law, the court chose the plaintiff, 
stating: "We think the damages cannot be said to flow naturally and 
directly from defendants' negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiff's 
should not be allowed to recover losses which they could have avoided 
by the exercise of reasonable care."" The dilemma faced in National 
Surety was similar, but the outcome quite different. 
2. National Surety 
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand'8 is often cited for the proposi-
tion that the "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has 
contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to 
report the truth.'''9 In National Surety, the defendant auditors failed to 
detect a "kiting"60 scheme perpetrated by an employee. The auditors 
would have detected the scheme had they performed the relatively sim-
ple procedure of verifying cash balances. Upon being sued, the account-
ants asserted the defense of contributory negligence, arguing that the 
client's negligence in conducting its business made possible the unde-
tected embezzlement. In rejecting the defense of contributory negli-
gence, the court stated: 
We are, therefore, not prepared to admit that accountants are im-
mune from the consequences of their negligence because those who 
employ them have conducted their own business negligently . . . . 
Accountants, as we know, are commonly employed for the very pur-
pose of detecting defalcations which the employer's negligence has 
made possible. Accordingly, we see no reason to hold that the ac-
countant is not liable to his employer in such cases. Negligence of the 
employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the account-
ant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth .... 
That was the principle applied in Craig v. Anyon where the embez-
zler had been negligently represented to the accountants as a person 
46. 212 A.D. at 64, 208 N.Y.S. at 267. 
47. /d. at 66, 208 N.Y.S. at 268. 
48. 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939). 
49. /d. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
50. "Kiting" is the pro,ess of transferring funds from one account to another in a circular 
fashion, thereby disguising a shortfall of funds in the accounts. 
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to be trusted.11 
This rule has been adopted in a number of jurisdictions.12 
It is interesting to note that the court saw its opinion as being in 
harmony with Craig v. Anyon. If National Surety and Craig v. Anyon 
are indeed in harmony, a good deal of discussion over the years was 
made on the wrong premise. Regardless of whether the differences are 
perceived or actual, the cases continue to be useful for discussing the 
merits of whether comparative negligence should apply in accounting 
malpractice actions where the plaintiff has not impeded the account-
ant's ability to fulfill his duty. 
B. Choosing Between Craig v. Anyon and National Surety-A Choice 
Past Its Prime 
Courts adopting either National Surety or Craig v. Anyon have 
often overlooked three key points suggesting that the rationale for 
adopting either rule outside of the context of contributory negligence is 
inappropriate. First, both Craig v. Anyon and National Surety were 
decided under a common law contributory negligence scheme of ali-or-
nothing. The harshness of that rule required a court to justify its bal-
ancing of the equities of the case in favor of one litigant over the other. 
Second, the facts in National Surety were weighted in the plaintiff's 
favor; that is, the accountant's conduct was clearly more egregious than 
the plaintiff's. However, under the contributory negligence standard, 
the plaintiff would have been denied recovery for being somewhat neg-
ligent. Third, the facts in Craig v. Anyon were more heavily weighted 
in favor of the defendant accountant, whose negligence appeared less a 
cause of the losses than the plaintiff's. Accordingly, the court fashioned 
a remedy under the contributory negligence standard that barred the 
plaintiff from recovery. 
The facts, therefore, offer a better explanation of the different rul-
ings than does the interpretation that the cases set forth broad polar 
pronouncements of policy. Laboring under the harsh realities of the ali-
or-nothing rule of contributory negligence, the court in each case justi-
fied its holding by articulating a policy behind it. It is inappropriate, 
therefore, to take these two decisions out of context and apply them 
51. 256 A.D. at 235-36, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
52. Cases adopting the National Surety rule include: Fullmer v. Wohlfeiler & Beck, 905 
F.2d 1394 (lOth Cir. 1990) (interpreting Utah law); Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 345 N.W.2d 300 (1984); 
Jewelcor Jewelers & Distribs. v. Corr, 373 Pa. Super. 536, 542 A.2d 72 (1988); Greenstein, 
Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). But see University Nat'l 
Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
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across the board in all accounting malpractice cases. This is especially 
so in a comparative negligence jurisdiction where some middle ground 
is available to alleviate the harshness of the ali-or-nothing result of con-
tributory negligence. 
When viewed in their factual and historical contexts, Craig v. 
Anyon and National Surety may well be decisions of a by-gone era. 
While they and the service they rendered should be remembered with 
respect, they should not continue to rule in their infirmity if a better 
rule is available. The case for unrestricted application of comparative 
negligence in accounting malpractice cases is compelling, as discussed in 
the balance of this comment. 
V. THE CASE FOR UNRESTRICTED APPLICATION oF CoMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE-TRENDS AND PoLICIES 
Recent cases show a trend toward less restrictive application of 
comparative negligence in suits against accountants. A jurisdictional re-
view of cases reflective of this trend and the policies they articulated is 
presented below. The National Surety rule is analyzed in the context of 
the fairness, deterrence, and compensation policies of tort law. The con-
clusion drawn from this exercise is that policy concerns are better satis-
fied within the comparative negligence framework. 
A. Recent Cases Applying Comparative Negligence in Suits Against 
Accountants 
1. Wisconsin 
In /mark Industries, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co.,"3 Imark Indus-
tries brought an action for negligent misrepresentation against Arthur 
Young after a debtor of Imark Industries defaulted on a loan. Arthur 
Young had audited the financial statements of the defaulting company, 
and Imark Industries had allegedly relied on the statements in ex-
tending credit. The jury found that the officers of the defaulting com-
pany had made intentional misrepresentations to Arthur Young in the 
course of the audit and that Arthur Young had justifiably relied on 
those misrepresentations."• However, the jury also found that the ma-
jority of the audit errors resulted from Arthur Young's own negli-
gence."" The trial court applied comparative negligence principles and 
divided the fault between the officers who made the initial misrepresen-
tations and Arthur Young. 
53. 148 Wis. 2d 605, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989). 
54. ld. at 614-16, 436 N.W.2d at 315-16. 
55. ld. 
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The issues raised on appeal were related to certain aspects of the 
application of comparative negligence to the peculiar facts of the case. 
However, the applicability of the comparative negligence statute to ac-
counting malpractice actions was not questioned nor the National 
Surety rule discussed. Rather, the comparative negligence issue appears 
to have been sent to the jury as a matter of course, and its application 
was not challenged on appeal.li6 Under National Surety, the defense of 
contributory negligence would not have been available. 
2. Minnesota 
In Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. ,rn the Minne-
sota Supreme Court specifically rejected the National Surety rule. 118 In 
that case, plaintiff sought to hold accountants liable for negligent fail-
ure to detect embezzlements by the plaintiff's employees. The trial 
court, however, denied plaintiff's motion in limine to bar evidence of 
the plaintiff's negligence that did not directly affect the ability of the 
accountants to perform their duty. Consequently, the jury apportioned 
80% of the liability to the plaintiff.li9 On appeal, the court of appeals 
held that the trial court erred in not following the National Surety 
rule.60 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, stating that the "applica-
tion of the broad definition of fault as set forth in the comparative fault 
statute can be particularly appropriate . . . in an action by a client 
against an accountant for negligent failure to discover embezzlements 
•••• "
61 The supreme court's rationale for rejecting the National 
Surety rule was that "the persons who hire accountants, usually busi-
nesspersons, should also be required to conduct their business activities 
in a reasonable and prudent manner."62 The conclusion reached by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court is more akin to the Craig v. Anyon ap-
proach permiting the jury to consider the plaintiff's negligence. 
3. New Jersey 
In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,83 the court expressly stated that 
an injured party's recovery in an accounting malpractice case may be 
56. /d. at 625, 436 N.W.2d at 319-20. 
57. 454 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1990). 
58. /d. at 909. 
59. /d. at 906. 
60. /d. at 907. 
61. /d. at 909. 
62. /d. 
63. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). 
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limited or denied under New Jersey's comparative negligence statute,64 
which is also modeled after the Wisconsin statute.611 
In discussing the increasingly open-ended exposure of accountants 
for their work, the court stated: 
The extent of financial exposure has certain built-in limits . . . . The 
injured party would be limited to recovery of actual losses due to reli-
ance on the misstatement. Negligence of the injured party could bar 
or limit the amount of recovery under the Comparative Negligence 
Act. The accounting firm could seek indemnification or contribution 
from the company and those blameworthy officers or employees.88 
The court in Adler, therefore, expresses the view that comparative neg-
ligence is a counter-balance to the expansive scope of duty that an ac-
countant owes to those who rely on his work. The National Surety 
rule, however, would tip this counter-balance by leaving an auditor 
completely exposed to the more expansive liability, while at the same 
time greatly restricting his defense of comparative negligence. 
4. Texas 
In Texas, the use of comparative negligence in an accounting mal-
practice case was upheld in University National Bank v. Ernst & 
Whinney. 67 There, a bank sued its independent auditors for failure to 
disclose the uncollectibility of certain loans. The auditors alleged that 
the bank negligently caused its own damages by making the bad loans. 
Negligence was apportioned 59% to the bank and 41% to the audi-
tors.68 Nothing in the opinion indicates that the bank had in any way 
prevented the auditors from performing their duty, even though the 
previous Texas decision Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Market-
ing, Inc. 69 adopted the National Surety rule. 
Texas subsequently amended its comparative negligence statute in 
1987 to specifically include public accountants. 70 Significantly, the new 
64. /d. at 350-51, 461 A.2d at 152. 
65. Rawson v. Lohsen, 145 N.J. Super. 71, 366 A.2d 1022 (1976), cited in Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 913 (Utah 1984). 
66. 93 N.J. at 350-51, 461 A.2d at 152 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
67. 773 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
68. /d. at 708. 
69. 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
70. TEX. C1v. PRAC. & REM. § 33.001(c) (Vernon 1987) provides: 
In an action in which a claimant seeks damages for harm other than personal injury, 
property damage, or death, arising out of any action grounded in negligence, including 
but not limited to negligence relating to any professional services rendered by an archi-
tect, attorney, [or] certified public accountant, ... a claimant may recover damages 
only if his percentage of responsibility is less than or equal to 50 percent. 
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Texas statute groups accountants with other professionals and does not 
suggest that they be treated differently. Because University National 
Bank was decided after Greenstein and because of the statutory amend-
ment to specifically include accountants, it appears that application of 
comparative negligence in comparative malpractice cases is favored by 
both the Texas judiciary and legislature. 
5. Michigan 
In Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand,71 defendant 
accountants failed during a routine audit to detect a $1.5 million dollar 
embezzlement. In a case of first impression, the Michigan court found 
that the application of comparative negligence in accounting malprac-
tice cases is proper, stating: 
With comparative negligence the result is not so harsh and the policy 
considerations that accountants should not be allowed to avoid all lia-
bility due to some negligence on the part of the client are not present. 
We find the application of comparative negligence to be proper as 
neither party is absolved of fault due to the other's negligence. Com-
parative negligence creates an incentive for both parties to use due 
care.72 
The court saw no reason to restrict the application of comparative neg-
ligence in accounting cases. The rationale of providing an incentive to 
both auditors and those who hire them echoes the reasoning of Halla 
Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furie & Co.13 
6. Florida 
The court in Devco Premium Finance Co. v. North River Insur-
ance Co. H also rejected National Surety, citing instead Craig v. Anyon 
as the better rule. 711 In Devco Premium Finance, auditors negligently 
failed to determine that a significant number of accounts receivable 
were uncollectible. The same information, however, was available to 
the client who also negligently failed to discover the problem. The trial 
court apportioned negligence 80% to the client and 20% to the account-
ants. On appeal of the comparative negligence issue, the court stated 
that "plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for losses which they 
71. 142 Mich. App. 531, 369 N.W.2d 922 (1985). 
72. /d. at 535, 369 N.W.2d at 925. 
73. 454 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1990). See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
74. 450 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984). 
75. /d. at 1220. 
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could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care."76 
B. Cases Applying Comparative Negligence in Suits Against Other 
Professionals 
A review of cases in which comparative negligence has been ap-
plied in suits against other professionals is also helpful in determining 
how it should be applied in cases dealing with accounting malpractice. 
1. Illinois-attorney malpractice 
Comparative negligence was applied in an attorney malpractice 
case brought in a federal court under Illinois law in Greycas, Inc. v. 
Proud.77 There, an attorney told his client specifically that he had con-
ducted a UCC search when, in fact, he had not. The court stated that 
comparative negligence is as much a defense to negligent misrepresenta-
tion as to any other tort of negligence.78 Accountants often fall victim to 
negligent misrepresentation claims and, therefore, should likewise be 
permitted to invoke the defense of comparative negligence. 
2. Connecticut-attorney malpractice 
In Somma v. Gracey,19 a malpractice claim was brought by clients 
against an attorney. The court stated that "[i]n situations where the 
claim of malpractice sounds in negligence, the defense of comparative 
negligence should be permitted."8° Connecticut's comparative negli-
gence statute specifically applies to economic losses.81 The Connecticut 
approach also supports the proposition that comparative negligence 
should not be limited to cases involving physical injury. 
3. New Jersey-investment advisor negligence 
Erlich v. First National Bank of Princeton82 is another New 
Jersey case in which comparative negligence was applied to pecuniary 
losses occasioned by professional negligence. In that case, an investor 
sued a professional investment advisor who had recommended concen-
tration in a single stock that failed. The court held the application of 
comparative negligence was proper because the plaintiff, though not a 
76. ld. (quoting Craig v. Anyon, 212 A.D. at 66, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 268). 
77. 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). 
78. 826 F.2d at 1566. 
79. 15 Conn. App. 371, 544 A.2d 668 (1988). 
80. Jd. at 378, 544 A.2d at 672 (citations omitted). 
81. Jd. 
82. 208 N.J. Super. 264, 505 A.2d 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
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sophisticated investor, was sufficiently knowledgeable of investments to 
be found negligent in the handling of his own investments.83 Likewise, 
it seems that sophisticated investors should not be allowed to escape 
liability for their own negligent decisions through application of the 
National Surety rule just because they did not interfere with an audi-
tor's ability to perform his duty. Otherwise, accountants become guar-
antors of investors' losses. 
These cases involving professional negligence, as well as those 
cases involving accountants, illustrate the increasing acceptance of ap-
plying comparative negligence principles in all professional negligence 
cases. The policies underlying this trend are next examined. 
C. Policy Reasons for Applying Comparative Negligence in Account-
ing Malpractice Actions 
The public policy underpinnings of tort law are deterrence and 
compensation.84 Fairness, of course, should be a goal of any legal 
scheme. Comparative negligence has been adopted by a majority of 
states because it is thought to serve these policies better than the har-
sher system of contributory negligence. Each of these policies is re-
viewed below in light of the National Surety rule in an attempt to 
ascertain whether the purpose of the policy is better served by that rule 
or by the unrestricted application of comparative negligence. 
1. Fairness 
The court in Rigtrup stated that "the purpose of the [comparative 
negligence] statute was to abolish contributory negligence as a complete 
defense and thus avoid the harshness which sometimes resulted when a 
party seeking redress was himself negligent . . . . " 811 This same ration-
ale of avoiding the harsh results of contributory negligence was stated 
by the court in Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand86 as 
the reason for applying comparative negligence in an action against an 
accounting firm, even though there was no showing of interference with 
the firm's performance of its duty. 87 
The harshness to be avoided under the common law was the aU-
or-nothing effect of the complete bar against plaintiffs' claims that ac-
83. Id. at 302, 505 A.2d at 240. 
84. See W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON oN 
TORTS, § 1, at 5-7 (5th ed. 1984). 
85. 563 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Utah 1977). 
86. 142 Mich. App. 531, 369 N.W.2d 922 (1985). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying 
text. 
87. 142 Mich. App. at 535, 369 N.W.2d at 925. 
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companied contributory negligence. The critical question is whether the 
National Surety rule furthers the goal of minimizing the harshness of 
contributory negligence. A simple hypothetical shows that, in certain 
situations, it does not further these goals, and illustrates that the Na-
tional Surety rule actually is an impediment to their achievement. 
This hypothetical closely resembles the facts of Halla Nursery, 
Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. 88 In the hypothetical, an auditor fails 
to detect embezzlements by his client's employee, and the client suffers 
a loss. The facts are such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
accountant was 20% at fault for not discovering the defalcation and that 
the client was 80% at fault for negligent supervision of the employee. 
The client did not impede the auditor's ability to perform his duties. 
Under the common law of contributory negligence, the client in 
this hypothetical would recover nothing; the accountant would be ab-
solved. Pure comparative negligence avoids this result by allowing the 
plaintiff to recover the 20% occasioned by the accountant's negligence. 
The modified comparative negligence, or "50% rule," of Utah's com-
parative negligence statute89 would be a complete bar to recovery. 
Under either pure or modified comparative negligence law, application 
of the National Surety rule produces the amazing distortion of allowing 
the client to recover 100% of the loss from his accountant. This distor-
tion is caused by completely denying the accountant the defense of com-
parative negligence. Assuming the loss was $100,000, the apportion-
ment of damages under the various rules would be as follows: 
Rule 
Common law 
Pure comp. neg. 
50% rule 
National Surety 
Amount of Loss 
Born by Defendant 
20% Negligent 
0 
$ 20,000 
0 
$100,000 
Amount of Loss 
Born by Plaintiff 
80% Negligent 
$100,000 
$ 80,000 
$100,000 
0 
This simple illustration shows that the National Surety rule not 
only maintains the harshness of the old common law of contributory 
negligence, but also refocuses it in the opposite direction-toward the 
defendant. Surely this was not the result envisioned by Justice Unter-
myer when he drafted the National Surety opinion. Justice Untermyer, 
it must be remembered, was laboring under the old contributory negli-
88. 454 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1990). See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
89. Utah's statute only allows recovery by a plaintiff from a defendant "whose fault exceeds 
his own." UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987). Therefore, if the plaintiffs negligence is 50o/o or 
greater, the statute hars any recovery. 
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gence standard in his attempt to fashion a fair result.90 
2. Deterrence 
It is well recognized that a primary goal of tort law is deterrence 
of future wrongs.91 Deterrence may be looked at in the context of who 
is bringing the action and the type of conduct that is the object of the 
deterrence. In accounting malpractice cases, there are three possible 
parties who might be deterred from acting negligently: the accountant, 
the client, and the third-party user of the accountant's work. It is help-
ful to separately analyze the deterrent effect of comparative negligence 
and the National Surety rule on each party. 
As for the auditor, the threat of liability for negligent performance 
of his duties is a powerful incentive to avoid negligence. The National 
Surety rule maximizes the deterrence directed toward the accountant by 
eliminating the possibility that anyone else will share the burden of 
liability by increasing the accountant's liability to 100%. This max-
imization is achieved, however, at the expense of fairness to the ac-
countant and a reduction in deterrence directed at other parties. 
Deterring negligent acts of clients is also a legitimate goal of tort 
law. The court in Halla Nursery Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. 92 
recognized that not only auditors, but also those that hire them, must 
be deterred from wrongdoing.93 Comparative negligence furthers the 
goal of deterrence by holding each wrongdoer liable, thereby avoiding 
the inequitable ali-or-nothing liability (and hence, deterrence) result of 
contributory negligence. National Surety reverses the direction of the 
ali-or-nothing result but does not change the fundamental flaw of di-
recting the deterrence effect toward only one party. 
Tort law should also deter third-party users of accountants' work, 
such as investors, from acting negligently. Investor negligence consists 
of poor investment decisions which have no effect on an auditor's ability 
to fulfill his duty. This poses the question of whether it is proper to 
compare an investor's negligent investment decision with an auditor's 
negligent performance of an audit. The idea is not without precedent. 
In E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp. v. Pappas,94 decided under Maryland 
law which has not adopted comparative negligence, plaintiff Hutton 
purchased mortgages on the secondary market from a company audited 
by the defendants. The plaintiffs suffered significant losses and sued the 
90. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
91. See, e.g., Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 365 (Utah 1989). 
92. 454 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1990). 
93. /d. at 909. 
94. 690 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Md. 1988). 
155] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE FOR ACCOUNTANTS 173 
auditors. The court stated that even if the financial statements plaintiffs 
claimed to have relied on were negligently prepared in some respects, 
they clearly showed the seller was in shaky financial condition and thus 
"did not paint a misleadingly rosy picture."911 The court further stated 
that a sophisticated investor cannot claim reliance on audit reports 
when it could have discovered the true nature of the situation by exer-
cising ordinary diligence.96 The court also found that even if the audit 
was performed negligently in some respects, Hutton had failed to act 
prudently in making a proper investigation of its investment and, there-
fore, as a matter of law, was barred from recovery under the doctrine of 
contributory negligence.97 
Similarly, in Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,98 the 
court allowed Coopers & Lybrand to set forth as a defense five factors 
in the financial statements it audited that would put a prudent lender 
on notice of the extremely shaky character of the debtor. Assuming that 
negligent conduct of investors is a proper subject of the deterrent goal of 
tort law, the question is whether the National Surety rule furthers that 
goal better than comparative negligence. The previous discussion of cli-
ent negligence leads immediately to the realization that the National 
Surety rule creates the same reverse ali-or-nothing distortion, this time 
between the accountant and the investor. The investor may act negli-
gently and still recoup his entire loss. This is not deterrence. Compara-
tive negligence, however, holds each party liable for his own negligence, 
thereby deterring both parties from acting negligently. 
3. Compensation-accountants are not guarantors 
The primary goal of tort law is to compensate victims. However, 
denying the defense of comparative negligence to accountants has the 
effect of turning them into guarantors. To illustrate, had the court 
adopted the National Surety rule in E.F. Hutton,99 the accountants 
would have been prevented from raising the plaintiffs negligence as a 
defense. The auditor, therefore, as the only party left to whom liability 
might attach, would have been liable for the entire loss. This policy 
arguably allows an investor to be more speculative in his investments 
by transferring the risk of loss stemming from his own negligence to the 
accountant. At least theoretically, an investor whose loss was caused 
95. /d. at 1474. 
96. /d. at 1475. 
97. !d. at 1477. 
98. 128 A.D.2d 218, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1987). 
99. 690 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Md. 1988). Here, the plaintiffs were sophisticated investors who 
negligently invested, and were denied recovery under Maryland's contributory negligence law. 
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99o/o by his own negligence and 1 o/o by an accountant's may recoup the 
entire 1 OOo/o of the loss from the accountant. Thus, the goal of compen-
sating victims would undoubtedly be achieved, but only by abandoning 
any notion of fairness. Commenting on this notion, the court in Delmar 
Vineyard v. Timmons100 stated that "an accountant does not guarantee 
correct judgment, or even the best professional judgment, but merely 
reasonable care and competence."101 
V. CONCLUSION 
Utah's comparative negligence statute should be applied in ac-
counting malpractice cases, even though the damages are pecuniary in 
nature. Such application should not be limited by the National Surety 
rule to situations in which a plaintiff has interfered with the account-
ant's ability to perform his duty. The current trend in the law is away 
from the National Surety rule, which trend is supported by the public 
policy objectives of tort law. Moreover, application of comparative neg-
ligence furthers the goals of fairness, deterrence, and compensation. 
Dennis V. Dahle 
100. 486 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). 
101. /d. at 920; see also Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 442, 345 
N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984) (adopting National Surety but noting that accountants are not 
guarantors). 
